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The Strange Career of Affirmative Action
JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD*
Affirnative action is hotly debated by proponents and opponents, who
share a passionate conviction about their respective viewpoints and who believe
that affirmative action as we currently know it will be eliminated in the near
future. In this Article, Professor Hochschild discusses the electoral future of
affirmative action and predicts that affirmative action will not be defeated at the
polls in more than a few jurisdictions in the foreseeable future. Professor
Hochschild substantiates her prediction with an explanation of several factors-
state population size, the role of direct initiatives, the political impact of
African-American and Latino residents-that affect the electoral prospects of
anti-affirmative action activity. Alternatively, Professor Hochschild advances
the argument that affirmative action might be abolished through the judicial
system over the next few years. She concludes with a discussion of whether one
can morally endorse (decry) judicial activism in this arena if one decried
(endorsed) it in the arena of school desegregation.
I. INTRODUCTION
I can best begin to depict the strange career of affirmative action through a
comparison of four quotations:
I am just curious: is there a difference between Pete Wilson and George
Wallace? I am afraid that we do not know the context of today's existence as
black people in America. George Wallace, in a failing effort, stood in the
school house door. Pete Wilson, in an ascendant effort, is re-establishing the
legitimacy of white privilege. The precipitous decline of black enrollment in
higher education in California and Texas is just the tip of an iceberg.
This latest ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court is but another knife into the dying
corpse that was at one time a living commitment to correcting and abating past
disparities that were codified by federal and state statutes in this country....
* William Stewart Ted Professor of Public and International Affairs, the Woodrow
Wilson School, Princeton University. B.A., Oberlin College; Ph.D., Yale University. Paper
prepared for presentation at the Symposium, Twenty Years After Bakke: The Law and Social
Science of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, The Ohio State University College of
Law, Columbus, Ohio, April 3-4, 1998. My deep thanks to Peter Furia and Deborah
Schildkraut for very helpful research assistance and comments and to Rodney Hero, Stanley
Katz, David Orentlicher, Nathan Scovronick, Martin Shefter, John Skrentny, and Steven
Teles for astute criticisms.
1 Electronic mail from Robert Newby, Chair and Professor, Department of Sociology,
Anthropology, and Social Work, Central Michigan University, to Association of Black
Sociologists Listserv <ABSLST-T@CMUVM.CSV.CMICH.EDU> (June 24, 1997) (on
file with author).
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Indeed, the writing is not only in the legal books but it is now of the wall, that
the civil rights gains made in the 60's, 70's, and for a brief time during the
later 80's, are slipping away like a barrel over Niagara Falls.
... That which civil rights warriors fought and died for is now being cast
aside and spat on by those who waited in the weeds to strike at the most
opportune moments.2
We have momentum, public opinion, and the forces of history solidly on our
side. Despite determined opposition, the era of race preferences is coming to
an end.3
Understand, this [elimination of "race preferences"] is something that is going
to happen. It's not a matter of if. It's a matter of when. Beyond being
unconstitutional, it's immoral. Just plain wrong. And the faster we can make it
happen, the better off our society will be. So whatever I can do to help hasten
that, I will do it.4
Disagreements between the first two quotations and the second two are
obvious. For the first two writers, a robust program of affirmative action is
essential to the continuation of the civil rights movement and more generally to
the attainment of racial and ethnic equality in the United States. But to the
second pair, affirmative action is antithetical to the deepest American values of
equality and individual merit, a gross distortion of the civil rights movement,
and a barrier to attaining racial and ethnic equality. This article will not explore
the substantive and philosophical differences between these positions; many
scholars have done so, including some in this volume, and I have other
concerns here.
I seek instead to focus on two characteristics that all four quotations share,
despite their substantive differences. First, both supporters and opponents of
affirmative action are passionately committed to their perspectives and concede
no moral legitimacy to the other side. Second, both supporters and opponents
believe that affirmative action is going to be eliminated, at least as we know it,
in the near future. I will argue that the first stance is inappropriate and
unhelpful and that the second prediction might be correct but for nonobvious
2 Electronic mail from Steve Higginbotham Braungiun, Deputy Director/Associate
Administrator, Wisconsin Clearinghouse for Prevention Resources, to Association of Black
Sociologists Listserv <ABSLST-L@CMUVM.CSV.CMICH.EDU> (June 20, 1997)
(citation omitted) (on file with author).
3 Efforts Gear Up Nationwide to Curb Racial Preferences (visited Feb. 2, 1998)
<http.//www.instituteforjustice.org...es/civil/RACECONCR_2 04 98pr.html> (statement
of Clint Bolick) (on file with author).
4 Trevor Coleman, Affrmative Action Wars, EMERGE, Mar. 1998, at 30, 36 (quoting
John Uhlmann).
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reasons.
A. Passionate Conviction
I will not repeat what I have written elsewhere about advocates' intense
commitment to one or the other side of the debate over affirmative action, 5 but
a few observations are relevant here. First, over the past three decades very
few of the hundreds of writers and speakers on the issue have changed their
minds, or even modified their views.6 Nathan Glazer made a very public shift
soon after California abolished affirmative action in the public realm: "In the
presence of [these] conditions [terrible schools in inner cities, family
dissolution, the growth of an embittered black underclass], an insistence on
color-blindness means the effective exclusion today of African Americans from
positions of influence, wealth, and power. It is not a prospect that any of us can
contemplate with equanimity. We have to rethink affirmative action." 7
5 See Jennifer Hochschild, Affirmative Action As Culture War, in THE CULTuIAL
T)mrroRIEs OF RAcE: WHrE AND BLACK BoUNDARiEs 615, 615-39 (Michele Lamont ed.,
forthcoming 1998).
6 One can contrast this fact with other policy arenas in which highly visible public actors
have (occasionally) changed their minds. Welfare politics for years resembled affirmative
action politics, in that advocates held much more stringent positions than did most Americans.
See STEvEN M. TELEs, WHosE WELFAu?: AFDC AND ELrE PoLmcs 41-59 (1996). But
welfare politics changed dramatically in the mid-1990s. President Clinton campaigned on a
pledge to "end welfare as we know it." Id. at 135. He later signed and defended legislation
that was not completely to his liking, but that certainly changed the welfare system
dramatically. A considerable number of Democratic officials at all levels of government
supported the new welfare legislation. Id. at 134-38, 153-62.
Vouchers for private (and possibly parochial) schools are another arena in which
passionate advocates hold strong and unswerving positions, but the public holds ambivalent or
more mixed views. The politics of school vouchers may come to look more like that of
welfare than that of affirmative action; that is, elites might soon be prepared to experiment
extensively with new formulations of public schooling. Former Congressman Floyd Flake and
other Democrats have recently endorsed school vouchers after a history of strong support for
public education; educators increasingly endorse hybrid structures such as charter schools,
privately-run public schools, contracts with private schools for particular services, and so on.
7 Nathan Glazer, In Defense of Preference, NEW REP BLIc, Apr. 6, 1998, at 18. Glenn
Loury made the same shift at about the same time:
I have been a critic of affirmative action policies for more than fifteen
years .... However in the wake of a successful ballot initiative banning affirmative
action in California, I now find it necessary to reiterate the old, and in my view still
valid, arguments on behalf of explicit public efforts to reduce racial inequality. The
current campaign against "preferences" goes too far by turning what before Proposition
209 had been a reform movement into an abolitionists' crusade.
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From the other side of the liberal-conservative spectrum, Mother Jones
magazine published a series of articles in 1997 questioning its previous support
for affirmative action-and was rewarded with excoriation in the letters to the
editors column over the next few issues.8 But these reformulations are as
notable for their rarity as for the vehemence with which the apostates are
attacked.9
The lack of movement by proponents on both sides of the issue is
surprising for three reasons. First, most ordinary citizens do not hold
impassioned or extreme views on the subject, and many are willing to change
their mind about it. Survey data show more of a moderate center on affirmative
action, one that is shared across races, than either the advocates or the media
reflect. Thus, while three-fourths of white Americans consistently agree that
blacks should "work their way up... without any special favors," so do about
half of black Americans. 10 Although 85% or more of whites endorse "ability"
rather than "preferential treatment" to determine who gets jobs and college
slots, so do about three-fifths of blacks. 11 Conversely, fully seven in ten whites
(compared with over eight in ten African Americans) favor affirmative action
programs "provided there are no rigid quotas.' 12 Solid majorities in both races
endorse special job training and educational assistance for women and people of
color, extra efforts to identify and recruit qualified minorities, and redrawing
voting districts to ensure minority representation. 13 A day after President
Clinton was reelected, two-thirds of Americans agreed that he should "put
more emphasis on affirmative action to improve educational and job
Glenn Loury, An American Tragedy: The Legacy of Slavery Lingers in Our Cities' Ghettos,
BROOKINGS REv., Spring 1998, at 38, 42.
8 See America's Changing Colors, MOTHE JONES, Sep./Oct. 1997 (special issue);
MOTHER JOEs, Nov./Dec. 1997 (letters to the editor).
9 Thomas Sowell, for example, described Glenn Loury's statement of partial support for
affirmative action as full of "soothing, sloppy words" and as an "exercise in inconsistency or
cosmetics." Glen Loury, Nasty Nuances and CCRJ, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 17, 1997, at 6
(quoting response by Thomas Sowell). In addition to the letters to the editor that Mother Jones
itself published, the magazine received the "Enemy Within" award from RaceFile, a
publication of the Applied Research Center, Oakland, California.
10 Charlotte Steeh & Maria Krysan, Affirmative Action and the Public, 1970-1995, PuB.
OPINION Q. 128, 130-31 (1996).
11 See id. at 130-31.
12 Id. at 132.
13 See id. at 128-29; see also Affirmative Action, GAnuP PoLL SPECIAL REPORT (The
Gallup Organization, Princeton, N.J.), July 1995, at 24; Affirmative Action, PoL.NG REP.
(The Polling Report, Inc., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 22, 1997, at 1,3 (citing CBS NewslN.Y.
Times poll).
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opportunities for women and minorities." 14
Opinions on certain forms of affirmative action are not only more
supportive than typically perceived, but they are also more malleable and less
important to most citizens' political stances than one would imagine from most
public discourse about the subject. About a third of white Americans cannot
make any association whatsoever with the phrase, "affirmative action." 15 One
quarter of those who voted for California's referendum banning affirmative
action in 1996 would have preferred a "mend it, don't end it" option. 16
Between one-fourth and one-half of self-identified Democrats or liberals in
recent polls have expressed either opposition to affirmative action or concerns
that it has "gone too far,17 or agree that "blacks and women have taken
advantage of it.' 8 Conversely, up to half of Republicans worry only a little or
not at all that recipients of affirmative action are taking advantage of it.19 In
June 1996, as the debate over the subject was heating up in national politics,
fewer than one in five whites claimed that affirmative action would be
extremely important in deciding their presidential preference. 20 Exit polls in
California the day after Proposition 209 passed found that for neither
Republicans nor Democrats "was affirmative action mentioned as one of the top
seven issues."21 Affirmative action, in short, does not typically polarize the
14 Clinton's Second Term, POLLINGREP. (The Polling Report, Inc., Washington, D.C.),
Nov. 18, 1996, at 1 (citing Princeton Survey Research Associates for Newsweek, Nov. 2-4,
1996).
15 See Steeh & Krysan, supra note 10, at 129.
16 See Edward W. Lampinen, Affirmative Action Foes Span Spectrum, S.F. CHRoN.,
Nov. 22, 1996, at B1.
17 Washington Post Poll, July 10-14, 1996, available in Public Opinion Online,
accession no. 0265919, POLL file; NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, Sept. 16-19, 1995,
available in Public Opinion Online, accession no. 0248113, POLL file; NBC NewslWall
Street Journal Poll, Mar. 4-7, 1995, available in Public Opinion Online, accession no.
0232835, POLL file; NBC NewslWall Street Journal Poll, Mar. 4-7, 1995, available in
Public Opinion Online, accession no. 0232836, POLL file.
Is CBS News Poll, Oct. 23-27, 1996, available in Public Opinion Online, accession no.
0267429, POLL file; see also Washington Post, Kaiser Foundation, Harvard University Poll,
July 22-Aug. 2, 1996, available in Public Opinion Poll Online, accession no. 0307969,
POLL file (asking respondents if "a major reason the economy is not doing better than it is"
includes "women and minorities get too many advantages under affirmative action").
19 See Washington Post Poll, July 10-14, 1996, available in Public Opinion Online,
accession no. 0265906, POLL file (asking respondents if "too many people take advantage of
affirmative action").
2 0 See NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, June 20-25, 1996, available in Public
Opinion Online, accession no. 0259637, POLL file.
2 1 Bruce E. Cain & Karin MacDonald, Race Was a Dull Wedge in Caifornia's 1996
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public's attitudes.
A second reason for surprise at the almost unanimous immobility of
advocates' convictions is the fact that the evidence does not warrant immovable
commitment on either side. Studies of the effects of affirmative action are
surprisingly sparse and very recent. 22 But the few in existence show that
affirmative action works much like most other public policies: it benefits a few
people greatly, benefits a larger number somewhat, harms a few, and does not
affect the majority of Americans in one way or the other. That broad
conclusion obtains for hiring and promotion decisions as well as for admission
into universities. 23
Affirmative action has made a notable difference in employment in the
largest firms and in public employment such as fire and police departments,
social work, and probably, public school teaching.24 But more and better
education, enforcement of laws against wage and employment discrimination,
and migration to the North and urban areas are responsible for most of the
reduction in the gaps between blacks' and whites' wages and job status over the
past four decades. 25
With regard to universities, during the 1980s the most selective four-year
colleges and universities were more likely than other institutions of higher
education to admit African American and Latino students preferentially.
26
Presidential Campaign, PUB. AFFAIRS REP., Mar. 1997, at 12 (inquiring about presidential
votes). The issue of affirmative action is much more salient to Afican Americans than to
members of any other race or ethnicity. In a 1996 survey, over half of blacks said that
affirmative action would be extremely important in deciding their vote for president. See id.
In a California poll a few days before the 1996 election (in which Proposition 209 would be
decided on), twice as many blacks as whites (23% to 12%) said that they would change their
vote for president depending on the candidates' stance on the proposition. See id. This point
will become important in my later discussion of the political future of affirmative action. See
infra Part II.
22 On this dimension, affirmative action differs from welfare policy-about which there
is a long tradition of not-always-consistent empirical research-and resembles debates over
school choice.
23 See Hochschild, supra note 5, at 622-26; WILLAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE
SHAPE OF THE RIvER (1998); BARBARA F. REsKIN, THE REAL= OF AFFn mATIVE ACTION
IN EMPLOYmENT (1998).
24 See HARRY J. HOLZER & DAvID NEumARK, WHAT DoEs AFFIRmAW ACTON Do?,
4-5, 33-37 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6605, 1998).
25 See James Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal
Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79
AM. ECON. REV. 138, 173-74 (1989).
26 See Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions, in THE
BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 431 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998),
reprinted in 59 OHIo ST. L.J. 971 (1998).
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There is no reason to think that energetic affirmative action practices harmed
these elite schools; by the end of the decade, their tuition had risen
disproportionately compared with that of other universities, as had the number
of students applying for admission.27 In non-elite schools, which 80% of
college students attend, admission rates for students of different races with
similar characteristics were essentially the same.28
No systematic evidence shows harm to beneficiaries of affirmative action in
either universities or jobs. In fact, the best studies show clear benefits to
affirmative action recipients. 29 It is difficult to find evidence of harm to
identifiable whites beyond the fact that every year many applicants (most of
whom are white) do not attain a coveted slot in Harvard's first-year class or do
not receive the promotion that they believe they deserve. That failure to attain
what they wish and perhaps warrant is painful, but it is not a violation of rights
or even necessarily of deserts. If affirmative action does little harm, however, it
also does little good where help is most desperately needed-in inner cities and
rural communities where some African Americans remain mired in unsafe
neighborhoods, substandard housing, atrocious schools, and joblessness.
Finally, one might be surprised at the depth of advocates' mutual animosity
because, at base, proponents of all sides of the debate over affirmative action
appeal to the same values-equal opportunity, fairness to all participants, the
American dream of success, and racial integration.3 0 They clearly differ in their
definition of these values, with the chief discrepancy lying in the distinction
between "individual rights" and "group rights." But that distinction is
analytically fuzzy, to say the least. Philosophically, it is perfectly possible to
favor the pursuit of both kinds of rights. In fact, most proponents of affirmative
action agree that the government should sustain individual rights as well as
enhance group rights; similarly, most opponents concur that the government
should respect group identities and sensitivities as well as protect individual
rights. Thus, in the context of a broad set of possible values to draw upon and
potential conflicts among values, the moral debates swirling around the issue of
affirmative action do not cut very deep philosophically or normatively.
In short, the passion with which both proponents and opponents of
affirmative action argue their case seems out of proportion to its tangible
consequences for most Americans. It grows instead from the symbolic value of
2 7 See CmAREs T. COO TER, BUYING THE BESr 58-81 (1996).
28 See Kane, supra note 26.
29 See Robert Davison & Ernest Lewis, Affirmative Action and Other Special
Consideration Admissions at the University of California, Davis, School of Medicine, 278
JAMA 1153, 1153-58 (1997); BOWEN & BOK, supra note 23.
30 This observation also holds for intense debates over some other policy issues, such as
welfare or health care policy, but not for others such as the death penalty or abortion.
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affirmative action for a small proportion of the population. I seek here not to
explain this passion, but instead to show how its roots in symbolic rather than
material import will affect the political future of affirmative action. That leads
me to the second similarity between the two pairs of quotations with which I
started-their shared conviction that affirmative action will soon be abolished.
B. The Predicted Demise of Affirmative Action
Voters have had three chances to decide the fate of public or state-
supported affirmative action-in California where it was abolished via
Proposition 20931 in November 1996, in Houston, Texas, where it was retained
via Proposition A32 a year later, and in Washington state where it was rejected
in November 1998. In approximately twenty-five other states, there has been or
currently is anti-affirmative action activity in the electoral arena.33 That activity
comprises proposals for legislation, state constitutional amendments, and
propositions for direct citizen votes. Its purpose is to abolish the practice of
affirmative action-sometimes defined as preferential treatment or set-asides-
by any public agency or actor.34 In eight states, legislators have submitted bills
to promote public sector affirmative action. One such bill passed in Oregon. I
will not consider the pro-affirmative action activity further in this article. Figure
135 identifies the fifty states by evidence of politically organized opposition to
the public use of affirmative action between 1995 and the summer of 1998.
311996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 209 (West) (enacted as CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 in
1996, "The State shall not discriminate against or grant preferential treatment to any
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting").
32 See Julie Mason, Court Backs Proposition A Ballot Wording; Appellate Ruling
Delivers Setback to Affirmative-Action Opponents, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 27, 1997, at Al (as
corrected).
33 1 received the idea for conducting this analysis and the initial list of states from a
helpful paper by Kellough, Selden, and Legge. See J. Edward Kellough et al., Affirmative
Action Under Fire: The Current Controversy and the Potential for State Policy Retrenchment
(Aug. 28-31, 1997) (paper for presentation at the Ninety-third Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association) (on file with author).
34 We generated the list of states in which there is "anti-affirmative action activity"
through a Lexis-Nexis search of all states from January 1995 through July 1998. We
confirmed these results with the website entitled Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
Online Center: Affirmative Action in the States. See <www.civilrights.org/aa/state.html>
(visited Aug. 20, 1998). In some states, there has been more than one such activity in a
legislative session, or activity over several years. However, because the unit of analysis in the
discussion below is states, I combined all activities into the "yes" side of a yes/no dichotomy.
35 See infta Part II.A.
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In no state beyond California and Washington has the anti-affirmative
action measure come close to passage. Neither is it demonstrably on the way to
a final decision in any other state (although I write so soon after the 1998
election that its effects are completely unknown as yet). In four states that have
seen anti-affirmative action proposals, the measures died in 1995 or 1996, and
have not been revived. 36
At the national level, several bills have been submitted to the House of
Representatives or the Senate over the past few years. Few have come to a vote
even in committee, and none have come close to passage by either branch of
Congress.
How should we make serlse of this history? Are California and Washington
anomalies or the precursor to a future that has not quite arrived yet? All four of
the writers whom I quoted at the beginning of this Article, and most
commentators on Proposition 209 (until recently), assumed the latter. Based on
electoral and demographic trajectories, I assume the former.
I. THE ELECTORAL FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A wise economist in public service once warned his audience that, to retain
his job, he had learned never to give a number and a date at the same time. Not
being an economist or in public service, I shall violate this advice and predict
that affirmative action will not be defeated at the polls in more than a handful of
jurisdictions other than California and Washington (the number) in the
foreseeable future (the date). My grounds for that prediction begin with a
systematic analysis of which states have experienced anti-affirmative action
activity. It then uses the results of that analysis to point toward a set of
explanations for why that activity has not, and arguably will not, generate
substantial change in affirmative action laws.37
36 Nevertheless, to be conservative I include them among the "anti-affirmative action
activity" states in the analyses below.
37 Authors of a few recent articles have shifted from the general study of diffusion of
innovation across states, or patterns of similarity and dissimilarity in state cultures and
structures, to analyses of variations in particular state-level policies. See Frances Berry &
William Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations, 84 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 395,
395-415 (1990); RODNEY HERO, FACES OF INEQUALnT: SOCIAL DivERsrrY IN AMERcAN
PoLmcs (1998); DAviD NICE, PoUcY INNOVATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT (1994). My
analysis is in that sense (if no other) similar to theirs. For a systematic and recent summary of
findings about diffusion of innovations across states, see Scott P. Hays, Innovation Diffusion:
What We Know (Apr. 23-25, 1998) (paper for presentation at the Midwest Political Science
Association Annual Conference) (on file with author).
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A. Patterns of Support for Anti-Affirmative Action Measures
Five (sometimes compound) hypotheses summarize our search for differing
patterns between the states with and without anti-affirmative action campaigns
between January 1995 and mid-1998:
* The demographic hypothesis: Anti-affirmative action activity is likely to
increase given high or rising percentages of non-whites in a state's
population.
This is the simplest explanation-that anti-affirmative action activity
constitutes a straightforward reaction among whites to the apparent threat
implied by "de-Anglicization." Related to this general hypothesis are particular
hypotheses about levels and trends in state populations of particular non-Anglo
groups (the absolute number of blacks in a state, the trends in Asian and
Hispanic populations, and so on).
* The "high profile" states hypothesis: Anti-affirmative action activity is more
likely to occur in populous, urbanized, or prosperous states.
The appearance of anti-affirmative action campaigns in so many populous
and prominent (but otherwise diverse) states-including California, Texas, New
York, Illinois, Florida, Michigan, and Pennsylvania-inspired this hypothesis.
Wealthy states might offer slack political and financial resources that can be put
to use in an initiative campaign, regardless of the issue. States with large
populations might be unusually tempting targets for electoral strategists,
especially in presidential campaigns where the electoral college magnifies the
importance of the most populous states. They also offer the greatest likelihood,
arithmetically, that a political entrepreneur will arise to conduct an anti-
affirmative action campaign. Furthermore, states with substantial urban or
metropolitan populations might be arenas for heightened racial conflict.
* The regional hypothesis: Anti-affirmative action activity is likely to be most
common in the South and West.
Although this argument runs counter to the hypothesis about high-profile
states, one might expect the most anti-affirmative action activity in the deep
South and far West, and the least such activity in the liberal Northeast. The
former states have a long history of state support for racial policies preferred by
whites (in the case of the South), or of resistance to government regulation and
social policy (in the case of the West).
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* The institutional hypothesis: Anti-affirmative action activity is more likely to
occur in states in which the state constitution allows for direct ballot
initiatives.
Ballot initiatives are only one of the several ways in which anti-affirmative
action activity may become state law. But they uniquely permit opponents of
affirmative action to take direct advantage of the fact that most citizens oppose
affirmative action when it is associated with preferences or quotas. Proposals
for legislative action, in contrast, must run the gauntlet of legislatures, which
are well-known to be better suited to halting rather than promoting controversial
legislation.
* The party control hypothesis: Anti-affirmative action activity is more likely
to occur under unified Republican state governments.
Other than ballot initiatives, state legislatures are the primary venues for
non-judicial anti-affirmative action activity. More such bills seem likely to be
introduced in states in which the governor is Republican and both branches of
the legislature are controlled by the Republican party, for two reasons: (1) the
chance of passing a bill abolishing affirmative action in the public sector is
higher, and (2) the majority of voters already have demonstrated their relative
conservatism so they are less likely to punish promulgators of a conservative
bill.
Formal evaluation of these hypotheses is complicated by two factors-
having only fifty observations (one for each state) and having a "dummy"
dependent variable (a variable with only two possible values, 0 or 1, based on
whether a state had anti-affirmative action activity). 38 I therefore will first
discuss the full range of variables with which anti-affirmative action activity is
substantially correlated, and only then present a parsimonious and predictive
model of anti-affirmative action activity. 39
To evaluate the demographic hypothesis, we first tested for a relationship
38 Luckily, these two difficulties in the data pull in opposite directions. That is, while the
technique of logistic regression tends to inflate the regression statistics given that the model
has only to make an up or down guess as to the value of the dependent variable, the small
sample size makes for a very difficult test of the statistical significance of the other results.
39 For data used to evaluate these hypotheses, see THE CouNci-L OF STATE
GOvERNmEs, THm BOOK OF STATES: 1996-1997, 209 tbl.5.15 (1996) (for list of states with
direct initiatives); U.S. BuREAu OF TE CENSuS, STATSICAL ABStRACt OF THE UNMM
STATES 12 tbl.10, 13 tbl.l1, 28 tbl.26, 34 tbl.34, 40 tbl.42, 283 tbl.453, 284 tbl.454, 450
tbl.696 (1997) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSrRACr] (including undocumented immigrants,
legal immigration, racial population of states, partisan composition of state governments, total
population, percentage metropolitan, and state gross domestic product).
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between anti-affirmative action activity (hereafter "activity") and the percentage
of whites in a state's population in 1994. This broad formulation of the
hypothesis was weakly confirmed; white population levels show the predicted
negative correlation with activity, but only at a moderate magnitude (r = -.268)
and with a borderline degree of statistical significance. Tests for relationships
between activity and percentages of blacks and Hispanics in state populations
also generally supported the broad demographic hypothesis. Correlations for
percentages of blacks (r = .365) and Hispanics (r = .195) with activity were in
the predicted positive direction, and the former was highly statistically
significant.40 Finally, as the demographic hypothesis would predict, we found a
positive and significant relationship between 1996 legal immigration levels for
each state and activity (r = .338; p = .016), and a positive, though weak,
relationship between legal immigration per capita and activity. 41
We next tested the demographic hypothesis in terms of population trends
between 1980 and 1996. We did this only for states in which a given racial or
ethnic group constituted more than 3 % of the total population in 1996 because
trend data for states in which a given group is smaller are very misleading.
After several experiments, we imputed the missing trend data by assigning Os to
those states in which a given racial/ethnic group comprised less than 3 % of the
population.42 Using that technique, we found clear positive relationships
between activity and an increase in the black population (r = .286; p = .044),
40 However, the correlation between anti-affirmative activity and Asian-American
population levels was negative (r = -.094), although minimal and not statistically significant.
We also found a negative, but minimal, relationship (r = -.122), between anti-affirmative
action activity and population levels of Native Americans. Significance levels for whites were
.060, for blacks .009, for Hispanics .174, for Asians .515, and for Native Americans .399.
41 Immigration per capita correlated .231 with activity, with a significance level of .106.
No variable that measured immigration per capita proved significant.
42 We also analyzed the cases for which there were no "missing" data-34 cases for
black trends and 22 cases for Hispanic trends. This made it possible to develop a "perfect"
logistic regression model for anti-affirmative action activity using Hispanic population trends,
black population levels, and a dummy variable representing the existence of a direct initiative
process. Unfortunately, the model remained rather trivial inasmuch as it applied only to 22
states. Finally, we imputed to the lowest minority states (<3%) the statistics for the next-
lowest minority states (3-5%). The correlations in this case were trivial and statistically
insignificant.
It is inappropriate to assign a value for trends in states with very small populations of a
given racial or ethnic group, because an apparently large increase from a tiny base is
misleading (consider the meaning of a 300% increase in a population that moves from 100
members to 400 members in a state over 15 years). See, e.g., The Black Population is 20
Percent or Higher in 7 Southern States, Maryland, and DC; the Hispanic Population Exceeds
20 percent in 4 Western States, PuB. Pmas?., June 1998, at 12 (citing U.S. Bureau of the
Census publication).
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and a stronger relationship between activity and an increase in the Hispanic
population (r = .344; p = .014). In short, among demographic variables,
levels of the black population and trends in the Hispanic population are most
closely associated with politically organized opposition to the public use of
affirmative action.
The second hypothesis, on high-profile states, was confirmed more strongly
than any of the others at the level of descriptive correlation. Raw or total
population levels in 1996 (r = .453), the degree of metropolitanization in 1994
(r = .439), and gross state product in 1994 (r = .417) all proved to be strong
correlates of anti-affirmative action activity and significant at the .01 level or
below.
The third, regional, hypothesis receives at most weak statistical support,
depending on one's definition of region.43
Figure 1: State Anti-Affirmative Action Activity (1995-1998)
States without activity
LI States with activity
The map appears to show that anti-affirmnative action activity is particularly
common in the deep South and far West. But the correlation of region with this
activity is weak (r = .214) and not statistically significant (p = .144). And
43 There is no statistically significant pattern between activity and region if one uses the
nine regions of the country as defined by the Bureau of the Census. However, nine regions is
probably too many to be meaningful. They are also historically misleading in that they
combine Alaska and Hawaii (no activity) with the other three "Pacific" states (which all have
activity), and they split the deep South (Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana-all with
activity) across three distinct regions. Instead, we dropped Alaska and Hawaii from the
regional analysis (results would have been inflated by treating each as a "region of one"), and
divided the nation into Eastern, Southern, Midwestern, and Western regions.
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actually looking at the map gives one further pause. Activity in the ostensibly
libertarian West occurs not in Idaho and Wyoming, but in stereotypically liberal
Washington, Oregon, and California. Activity is consistent in the deep South,
but does not occur in the Virginias or Arkansas. The purportedly liberal
Northeast is less tolerant of affirmative action than the Midwest. In short, as
further analyses show, region is mostly trumped by demographic and state size
variables.44
The data support the fourth, institutional, hypothesis: the presence of direct
initiatives is positively and significantly correlated with anti-affirmative action
activity (r = .376; p < .01). Concretely, proposals to abolish the public use of
affirmative action have surfaced in fifteen of the twenty states that allow for
direct initiatives and in eleven of the thirty remaining states. Thus one might
conclude that the initiative process is close to sufficient, but not necessary, to
produce anti-affirmative action activity.
The fifth hypothesis, to my surprise, does not receive support. Unified
Republican control of state governments is either unrelated to or possibly
inversely related to anti-affirmative action activity. As with the regional
analysis, looking beyond the aggregate statistics is illuminating. In 1995, only
seven of the fifteen states which enjoyed unified Republican control (as of 1994)
saw anti-affirmative action activity in the legislature. In 1996, only five of the
ten analogous states did. Clearly there was no relationship between the presence
of conservative control of the government and the likelihood of proposing this
particular conservative policy change.
On the presumption that it might take a longer period of Republican control
to build up to anti-affirmative action activity, we examined Republican control
in 1990 and 1992, and states in which the Party had enjoyed two or three
consecutive two-year periods of unified control. Table 1 shows the results of
that analysis:
Table 1: Unified Republican Government and Anti-Affirmative Action
Activity
Variable Unified Unified Unified Unified Unified Unified
Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub.
1990 1992 1994 1996 2 terms 3 terms
Pearson r Correlation -.304* .061 -.058 -.010 -.012 -.074
Significance (2-tailed) .034 .679 .693 .944 .937 .612
44 In a categorical logistic regression, the best model using alternative divisions among
regions returns a joint significance of region of only 0.32. It might, of course, be important
that the only two states actually to pass a measure banning public use of affirmative action are
on the West Coast. But statistically speaking, that is anomalous.
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Most of these correlations are minimal; nevertheless, all but one is in the
opposite direction from that predicted. If it had any effect at all, unified
Republican control of government made anti-affirmative action activity less
likely. 45
Finally, I used this data in a logistic regression model to predict whether or
not a state engaged in anti-affirmative action activity between 1995 and 1998.
As Table 2 shows, seven independent variables show a clear bivariate causal
link with anti-affirmative action activity. They are presented here in descending
order of magnitude and significance: 46
Table 2: All Potential Bivariate Predictors of State-level Anti-Affirmative
Action Activity
R Significance
Metropolitanization, 1994 .2997 .0041
Total population, 1996 .2994 .0042
Gross state product, 1994 .2823 .0061
Direct initiative .2577 .0102
Percent black, 1994 .2530 .0112
Hispanic change, 1980-96 .2149 .0226
Black change, 1980-96 .1532 .0569
While any of these variables might reasonably be seen as a cause of anti-
affirmative action activity, problems of multicollinearity dictate that only a few
can go into a parsimonious predictive model. The three independent variables
with the highest bivariate regression coefficients (metropolitanization,
population size, and gross state product) are correlated with each other at a very
high level of around 0.9. This is to be expected, because all three are
alternative measures of state prominence. It is inefficient, however, to include
more than one of them in a predictive model. After a little experimentation that
even included one "perfect" but relatively trivial model,47 we ended up with the
following powerful logistic equation:
Activity = Bo + BIRawPop + B2lnitiative + B3Black + B4HispanicChange.
45 The statistically significant negative figure for 1990 is of little theoretical importance,
given that organized anti-affirmative action activity did not begin until 1995.
46 A dummy variable based on being one of the 19 states to receive the greatest number
of illegal immigrants in 1996 was also causally linked to activity and borderline statistically
significant at the bivariate level. It did, however, not survive in the multivariate analysis due
to the multicollinearity with total population.
47 See supra note 16.
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Each predictor holds up in the multivariate regression, and the model is
jointly very highly significant (p < .00001).48 Table 3 provides the precise
results of this regression analysis:
Table 3: Predictors of States with Anti-Affirmative Action Activity, 1995-
1998
B significance R
(standard error)
Total population in 1996 5.40E-07 .022 .218
(2.35E-07)
Initiative process 3.68 .009 .263
(1.41)
Percent Black in 1994 19.20 .009 .237
(7.35)
Hispanic change, 1980-96 .027 .016 .233
(.011)
Constant -7.01 .003 -
(2.35)
Perhaps the best way to judge the power of these four predictors is to
examine how much they together reduce the error that would occur if one made
random guesses about whether a state does or does not have anti-affirmative
action activity. In this case, the error is reduced by 66%-a very high
proportion. Put another way, the model correctly predicts the status of forty-
two out of fifty states, as compared with a likely prediction of only twenty-five
states if one simply tossed a coin.49
48 Kellough et al. similarly find that the proportion of the state's population that is
minority is significantly related to the appearance of legislative activity opposing affirmative
action. See Kellough, supra note 33, at 15-19. They found no significant relationship between
anti-affirmative action activity and the vote for President Bush in the 1992 election, state
median income, percent of high school graduates, presence of a Republican governor, region,
history of innovation, and other measures. See id.
49 According to this analysis, the state of Washington was not an obvious candidate to be
the only other state besides California in which an anti-affirmative action initiative reached the
voters. It has a small black population (3.1%), and not an especially large total population
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B. Explaining the Results
1. Population Size
The least self-evident of the four factors that remained in the final
regression equation is that of state population (alternatively, gross state product,
which had almost the same statistical impact). I would not have predicted its
strong impact compared, say, with the negligible impact of having a unified
Republican government. But in retrospect, several explanations seem plausible.
The cases of California, Washington, and Houston-the three locations
where the effort to abolish public use of affirmative action has been put to a
vote-all demonstrate the centrality of one or a few political entrepreneurs 50 in
getting the issue on the ballot. Any state or locality, of course, can produce a
skilled political actor who has financial resources, time, and a passionate
commitment to an issue-but other things being equal, the larger the number of
people in a political jurisdiction, the more likely such a person is to emerge.
That factor becomes especially important when coupled with the second of
(fifteenth in the nation). It does, however, allow for direct initiatives, and it has a rapidly
growing Latino population (from a small base).
Two additional factors not captured by our statistical analysis were also at work in this
case. Those were the presence of a few effective political entrepreneurs and an effective
media campaign. See Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of
Innovation, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 738 (1997); Steven A. Holmes, Washington State Is Stage
for Fight over Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1998, at Al; Craig Welch, The Mouth That
Roars, SPOKANE SPOKESMAN REv., Oct. 11, 1998, at Al. Both variables are not easily
susceptible to statistical analysis, unfortunately, because their presence is clearly visible only
in retrospect. In addition, "[n]o comparative state study... has attempted to integrate a state-
specific media measure, most likely due to the difficulty of measurement." Hays, supra note
37, at 7.
50 A political entrepreneur is a person who operates in the public sector, seeking to:
1. identify new missions and programs ... ;
2. develop and nourish aternal constituencies to support the new goals and
programs.... ;
3. create internal constituencies [within an agency or political body]...;
4. enhance the organization's [or political operatives'] technical expertise... in
order to ... implement new goals and programs;
5. motivate and provide training for members of the organization ... ; and
6.... idenify areas of vulnerability, followed by remedial action.
JAMESON W. DOIG & ERwIN C. HARGROVE, LEADERSHIP AND INNOVATION: A
BIoGRAPIcAL PERSPECIIVE ON EN PRENEmRr IN GovENmENT 8 (1987) (citation
omitted). No single person can do all of these things; an effective political entrepreneur is one
who does enough of them to attain a substantial portion of his or her new mission or program.
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the four key variables, the presence of a direct initiative process in the state (or
municipality, as in Houston). Initiatives give political entrepreneurs an
institutional framework within which to operate that is more accessible and free-
wheeling than a state legislature; conversely, political entrepreneurship is
essential for any issue to make it onto the ballot for a vote by the citizenry.
It may also be the case that states with large populations attract political
entrepreneurs from outside the state as well as from inside it, for substantive as
well as strategic reasons. Because small and large states have roughly similar
legislative processes, using roughly similar amounts of scarce resources in a
large state will produce a proportionally greater payoff in the substantive sense
of ending affirmative action for the most people. In addition, states with large
populations have a large number of votes in the electoral college, and will be
reported in highly visible national media. Thus, a political entrepreneur with
national electoral ambitions such as Governor Wilson in California will gain
more than simply one state's worth of political benefit by mounting an anti-
affirmative action campaign in a large rather than a small state.
The analysis of state size and wealth helps to explain why anti-affirmative
action activity occurs in some states but not others. It does not explain why that
activity has so far mostly failed. The presence of a direct initiative process
similarly does more to explain where activity occurs than it explains why
activity fails. Let us examine that claim more closely.
2. The Role of Direct Initiatives
I already noted that initiatives offer greater scope for the actions of a
political entrepreneur. In addition, they make it possible to bypass a legislature
in which legislative action is being blocked. That route to success must seem
especially appealing to opponents in view of the strong and consistent public
opposition (mostly among whites, a large majority of the voting public) to
affirmative action when framed in terms of preferences, reverse discrimination,
or quotas.
To understand the next step-why activity is being blocked in the
legislature, and why even efforts to end affirmative action through the initiative
process have, with two exceptions so far, failed-we need to turn to the third
and fourth variables which survived in the final regression equation.
3. The Conflicting Political Impact of Nonwhite Residents
The key to explaining both why anti-affirmative action activity occurs and
why that activity has largely failed so far lies in the complex political
implications of having a large or growing nonwhite population in a state. On
the one hand, in states where the proportion of blacks and the rate of increase in
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the Latino population is high, some whites presumably feel materially or
symbolically threatened, and their representatives respond by generating
activity to oppose affirmative action.51 This is a variant on V.O. Key's classic
thesis about white domination in areas with large black populations 52 although I
see no reason to believe that proponents of anti-affirmative action measures
themselves see their activities in that framework. On the other hand, it is
exactly in the states with large or growing nonwhite populations that white
politicians, corporate officials, and citizens are coming to terms with a changing
demographic mix and learning to deal with-or even see advantages in-the
changing demography. It is also in those states that African Americans or
Latinos are developing the capacity to defend their interests in the political
arena, and they usually define those interests to include public provision of
affirmative action.
Consider first the changing perspective of white elites and citizens. The
Conference Board53 is now promoting conferences on "managing diversity for
sustained competitiveness," in which the president and CEO of DuPont
Corporation is prominently quoted as saying that "we have proof diversity
improves our business performance .... Diversity in our company is itself a
business imperative vital to our ongoing renewal and our competitiveness into
the 21st century." 54 The four hundred executives attending such a conference
had at least two motives, beyond liberal good will, for their newfound
enthusiasm for diversity. At a minimum, "[t]hroughout the conference,
executives quietly said they do not want what happened at Texaco to happen to
51 D. Garth Taylor similarly finds that an increase in nonwhites, rather than the absolute
number of nonwhites, is associated with an increase in hate crimes in particular
neighborhoods in Chicago. See D. GARTH TAYLOR, WHEN WoRLDs COLuDE: CULTURE
CoNFucr AND REPORTED HATE CRIMES IN CmCAGO (1992) (a report to The Chicago
Commission on Human Relations); see also Donald Green et al., Defended Neighborhoods,
Integration, and Hate Crime, AM. J. Soc. (forthcoming 1998).
52 See V.0. KEY, SoUIHERN PoLmcs IN STATE AND NATION (2d ed. 1984). The
finding with regard to absolute proportions of nonwhites is Kellough et al.'s chief explanation
for the difference between states with and without anti-affirmative action activity; they
provide several citations to support it. See Kellough, supra note 33; see also Benjamin
Radcliff & Martin Saiz, Race, Turnout, and Public Policy in the American States, 48 AM.
REs. QTRLY. 775 (1995); Marylee Taylor, How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial
Composition of Local Populations, 63 AM. Soc. REv. 512 (1998).
53 Founded in 1916, the Conference Board, in the words of the frontispiece of every
Board publication, "strives to be the leading global business membership organization that
enables senior executives from all industries to explore and exchange ideas of impact on
business policy and practices." See, e.g., infra note 61.
5 4 MARGARET HART, MANAGING DIvERsrrY FOR A SUSTAINED CoMPETITIvENEss 5
(1997).
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them."55 More positively, they are discovering that firms which seek to appeal
to a wide array of potential purchasers do better if they have a sales force and
managers representative of disparate languages and cultures. 56 Thus,
affirmative action is, in the eyes of some executives, a necessary though
insufficient step on the way to the desired diversity.57 In this new corporate
climate, visible support for measures opposing affirmative action in the public
arena is simply a bad business practice. 58
The participants in this conference may have been unusual in their
newfound enthusiasm for diversity, and therefore affirmative action, but they
were not unique. 59 A 1995 survey of corporate CEOs found that 70% of the
140 surveyed, all of whom were affected by contract compliance programs,
reported favorable effects of their affirmative action programs. The same
proportion claimed that they would still use numerical goals to track fairness in
the workplace even if governmental regulations were abolished. They feared
the loss of uniform federal standards and the consequent variation in state and
55 Id. at 5. In late 1996, a senior executive of Texaco Oil Company secretly taped
several other executives making demeaning comments about African-American employees
and deciding how to destroy evidence of discriminatory hiring and promotion in the
corporation. The tapes were made public, and the political uproar was intense. It was resolved
by a record settlement of $176.1 million to compensate salaried black employees and to
design programs to overcome discrimination. As the vice president for human resources at
Texaco reminded the conference attendees, "[wihat happened to us can happen to you in a
heartbeat." Id. at 19.
56 According to the first vice president and senior director of Merrill Lynch, Inc., "[o]ur
clients, our shareholders are demanding more and more that our employees look like them,"
Peter Truell, The Black Investor, Playing Catch-Up, N.Y. Tws, Aug. 23, 1998, § 3, at 1.
57 "At Phillip Morris, 'diversity and affirmative action are very much connected.
Affirmative action builds the workforce, including women and people of color. It promotes
the understanding with regard to persons with disabilities, accommodation, and veterans.'"
HART, supra note 54, at 11 (quoting Shirley Harrison, Vice President of Diversity
Management at Phillip Morris); see also Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action
Became Diversity Management, 41 AM. BEhyAv. Sci. 960 (1998).
5 8 In this way, affirmative action is like environmental policy and guaranteed health
insurance. Large corporations can generally afford to support, or at least not oppose, these
measures. In addition, they maintain better relations with a wider array of potential customers
by taking neutral or slightly liberal positions than by taking strongly conservative stances that
purportedly would be more consistent with their market orientation.
59 In recent months, IBM has widely distributed an ad with a rainbow coalition of happy
workers consulting around a table beneath the headline "Diversity works." The text below the
picture reads, "It has long made sense to us at IBM to welcome and value individual
differences .... In our diverse marketplace, that's always good business." ATLANTIC MAG.,
June 1998, at 43 (paid advertisement by IBM).
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local requirements. 60 This result demonstrates a dramatic change over a decade;
in 1986, a Conference Board survey of human resource executives in six
hundred major U.S. companies found that "equal employment opportunity"
ranked twenty-second out of twenty-four concerns-just above sexual
harassment. 61
Thus opponents of affirmative action have found to their surprise and
disgust that their apparent allies in the conservative business community either
reject or politely distance themselves from political efforts to abolish affirmative
action. California's Proposition 209 was funded largely by the Republican Party
and individual Republican political actors. Corporations such as Shell Oil
Company, Boeing Corporation, Nordstrom's, and Pacific Gas and Electric
Company opposed it.62 Proposition A in Houston was funded mostly by the
leader of the initiative and the American Civil Rights Coalition;63 the Houston
Chamber of Commerce opposed it. Boeing, Weyerhauser, and Microsoft
opposed the proposition in the state of Washington, and Nordstrom's remained
neutral. No major corporation in the state supported it.64 Thus, although
corporations will continue to defend themselves against claims of
discrimination, and although it will be a long time-if ever-before corporate
leadership resembles the American racial, ethnic, or gender structures, 65 it
60 See Affimuive Action: A Course for the Future, LOOKING AHEAD, Aug. 1996, at 17
(publication of the National Planning Association, citing Peter Robertson).
61 See Lawrence Schein, Current Issues in Human Resource Management, 190 RES.
BuLL. 3-17 (1986) (publication of The Conference Board).
62 For a rather cynical description and explanation of "the lovefest between the
advocates and the corporate establishment" with regard to Proposition 209, see Heather
MacDonald, Why They Hate CCRI, WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 28, 1996, at 24. For additional
typical comments, see Amy Wood, Going Nowhere Fast: Affirmative Action Opponents
Stymied in the States, S. CHANGES, Spring 1998, at 10.
63 "The American Civil Rights Coalition is a grassroots advocacy organization focused
on the elimination of racial and gender preferences. Working with activists in different states
and in Washington D.C., ACRC will seek to achieve the same success achieved in California
in other states and at the federal level." American Civil Rights Coalition (visited Sept. 21,
1998) <htp://www.acrcl.org/>. The founder and chair of the ACRC is Ward Connerly, a
Regent of the University of California. He is an African American, a businessman, and a
friend and supporter of Governor Wilson. He spearheaded and was largely responsible for the
abolition of affirmative action in the state university system of California in 1996. See
American Civil Rights Institute, (visited Sept. 21, 1998) <http://www.acri.org/people/index.
html>.
64 See Cragg Hines, Affirmative Action Faces Test in Washington State Election, Hous.
CHRON., Oct. 22, 1998, at A12; Steven Holmes, Washington State is Stage for Fight over
Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1998, at Al; Patrick Mazza, Northwest Passage?, BLACK
ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 17, 1998, at 26-28.
65 Corporations have by no means solved the problem of racial discrimination in their
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nevertheless is safe to predict that most corporations will not actively support
measures to abolish affirmative action in the states or in Congress. 66
Likewise, leaders of elite educational institutions will not support measures
to abolish affirmative action. Almost all of the most senior administrators of the
University of California system opposed the 1996 abolition of affirmative action
in admission to publicly supported higher education. 67 Even the president of
San Jose State University, who "had written stinging critiques of affirmative
action" is "now more disposed toward it." 68 In light of the decline in the
number of African Americans and Latinos admitted to the University of
California after affirmative action was abolished, President John Bunzel
realized that "'there are no airtight, completely coherent, unassailable and
holistic answers on the question of affirmative action that are not only
theoretically perfect, but instrumentally practical.' 69 The senior administrators
of the University of Texas system similarly opposed the abolition of affirmative
action during the litigation of Hopwood v. Texas.70 Administrators in other
beleaguered state university systems are seeking to defend affirmative action in
admissions as much as they can in the current legal climate. 71 President Neil
Rudenstine of Harvard University devoted a major report to a defense of
affirmative action and diversity,72 and the sixty-two institutional members of the
Association of American Universities recently "express[ed their] 'strong
ranks. For a reminder that "systemic and even overt discrimination" remains in the
workplace, see Frank McCoy, Lawsuits Rock Corporate Discrimination, FOCUS: THE
MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF THE JOINT CENIER FOR PoLrrcAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, Oct.
1997, at 3-4.
66 Small or independent business owners are likely to support measures opposing
affirmative action. That was the pattern in California with regard to Proposition 209, and the
Houston Contractors Association supported the effort to abolish set-asides in Houston.
67 See, e.g., Chang Lin Tien, Wat a University Can Learn and Teach About Conflict
and Difference, in DILEMMA AND PROMISE: PERSPECnVES ON RACIAL DAvERSY AND
I-IGER EDUCATnON (Eugene Y. Lowe, Jr., ed., forthcoming 1998) (manuscript on file with
author); Electronic mail from Ruben Martinez to Listserv < diversity@lists.Colorado.EDU >
(July 25, 1995) (releasing statements by University of California President Jack Peltason) (on
file with author).
68 See Steven A. Holmes, Re-Rethinking Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 1998,
§4, at5.
69 Id.
70 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
71 See, e.g., Jeffrey Selingo, Affimative Action Plan for the 90's? Wisconsin Tries for
Diversity Without Numerical Goals, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 8, 1998, at A40; UW
President Backs Affirmative Action in Speech to Grads, BLACK IssuEs IN HGHER EDuC., July
9, 1998, at 10.
72 See Neil L. Rudenstine, The President's Report: Diversity and Learning, HAuvARD
GAZETE, Feb. 8, 1996, at 26-28.
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conviction concerning the continuing need to take into account a wide range of
considerations-including ethnicity, race, and gender-as we evaluate the
students whom we select for admission."' 73
Like corporate executives, university administrators have a variety of
motivations, including but not limited to liberal racial convictions, for
supporting affirmative action. Protecting their long-term political and economic
interests is one important motivation, especially for public universities. As a law
professor at the University of Texas pointed out, "'If the majority of people in
this state are going to be Mexican-American and African American, and they
are going to assume many of the leadership roles in the state, then it's going to
be big trouble if the law school doesn't admit many minority students-it's
going to be a bomb ready to explode."' 74 The president of the University of
Wisconsin system was even more blunt: "'It would be much easier to let the
[affirmative action] plan we have expire and do nothing .... But we are
committed to maintaining educational opportunities for all citizens. We're a
public university, and minority parents pay taxes to support this university just
as whites do. "'75
As these comments begin to suggest, white elected officials are in the most
complicated position, and their stance with regard to measures to abolish
affirmative action is fascinatingly complex. States with substantial black
populations or rapidly growing Latino populations are the states most likely to
experience political efforts to abolish the public use of affirmative action. 76 But
those are also the states in which blacks, and increasingly Latinos, are moving
into political offices. 77 Those newly elected officials can sometimes block anti-
affirmative action measures by virtue of their own position in the legislature. 78
73 Karen W. Arenson, 62 Top Colleges Endorse Bias in Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
24, 1997, at A27. The American Council on Education also issued a slightly weaker
statement of support for "diversity," endorsed by 49 additional educational associations. See
ACEAdopts Diversity Statement, BLACK IsSs ]N HiGHER EDUC., Feb. 19, 1998, at 32.
74 James Traub, Testing Teras, NEw REPUBuIc, Apr. 6, 1998, at 20 (quoting Russell
Weintraub, Professor, University of Texas Law School).
75 Selingo, supra note 71, at 46 (quoting Katherine C. Lyall).
76 Hero explores how state politics and policies differ, depending on the racial and ethnic
composition of the state. He does not consider affirmative action, but his analysis provides a
useful context for my discussion here. See HERo, supra note 37.
77 As of 1993 (the last year for which data are available on blacks), 561 United States
federal and state legislators or elected executives were black, and as of 1994 (the last year for
which data are available on Hispanics) 199 were Hispanic. See STATSTICAL ABSTrACT,
supra note 39, at 286 tbl., 458, 459.
78 As a member of the South Carolina Black Caucus put it with regard to a bill to ban
affirmative action in state agencies, "'[Tihe Black Caucus had an opportunity to tie the bill
up.... We don't have enough power to pass something, but we do have enough to stop some
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At other times, they can persuade fellow legislators to halt an effort whose
consequences matter deeply to them and their constituents, but much less to
most others.79 After all, few lawmakers want to antagonize colleagues who feel
passionately about an issue or whose constituents do, especially if it is an issue
that is less salient to themselves or their own constituents.
A substantial black or rapidly growing Latino population creates an
additional set of cross pressures on white elected officials. Because white
Democratic politicians do not want to alienate the predominantly Democratic
black voters in their state, they are reluctant to oppose affirmative action. But,
because they also seek to halt the trend of the past few decades in which white
male Democrats are moving into the Republican party, they are equally
reluctant to support affirmative action too strongly. They mostly want the issue
to go away. White Republican politicians are eager to woo even a small fraction
of the black middle class away from the Democrats. And they are even more
eager, because it is a more likely prospect, to attract newly-middle-class or
newly-naturalized Latino voters into the ranks of their party.80 Thus, many of
them are reluctant to oppose affirmative action. But their chief constituency in
the 1990s is working- and middle-class whites, many of whom oppose strong
forms of affirmative action-therefore, they are also reluctant to support it. Like
the Democrats, Republican politicians mostly want the issue to go away. 81
Thus we see several rather distinct behaviors among white elected officials,
depending on their political calculations as well as their convictions. One set of
Republican politicians follows the lead of Governor Pete Wilson of California-
aggressively opposing affirmative action. They are the state legislators
sponsoring bills, constitutional amendments, or constitutional initiatives in the
twenty-five or so states discussed above. 82
A second and considerably larger set of politicians of both parties seeks
simply to avoid the issue. In an article headlined "Engler Quiet on Racial
Quotas: Governor Soft-Pedals Affirmative Action, Fears It's a No-Win
Situation... ," the Republican governor of Michigan claims that "'I've not
things.'" Wood, supra note 62, at 5.
79 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
80 "'If we remain a party of all white Southerners,' says one former Republican National
Committee aide, 'we'll be a dead party by 2010.'" David Grann, Close Races, NEw
R uBpuc, Mar. 9, 1998, at 11, 12.
81 Wood provides an excellent recent description of state legislators' responses to anti-
affirmative action bills; as she summarizes, "[B]ills are stalling because there is not a
Republican consensus." Wood, supra note 62, at 6. For a similar conclusion, although not
always a similar analysis to my own, see John D. Skrentny, Republican Efforts to End
Affirmative Action: Walking a Fine Line (forthcoming 1999) (on file with author).
82 See supra Part II.A.
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looked at' [a] proposed... initiative to ban affirmative action in state hiring,
contracting, and college admissions." 83 The Governor went on, "'[B]ut I think
perhaps the better approach is to allow the courts to rule on the case and that
may clear some of the confusion over what the rules are and at the same time
reduce the tension surrounding the issue"'-this from a partisan, activist
conservative "not generally known as a man to mince words." 84 Collective
political bodies are responding the same way as individual politicians; typical
headlines point out that "Legislatures Show Little Enthusiasm for Measures to
End Racial Preferences" 85 or "Few Governors Join Attack on Racial
Policies." '86 After all, "it's not the most party-broadening issue that we could
pursue at this time."8 7
A third, and the most interesting, group of white politicians cycles among
support for, silence about, and opposition to measures to abolish affirmative
action. This is the pattern of several nationally prominent Republicans, who
must respond to many conflicting constituencies at once. Consider the history of
Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich on affirmative action:
* November 1991: "'Why should Bill Cosby's daughter have an eligibility
for a 10% set-aside based on race? ... If it is numerical, and if it is
genetically based, it is wrong and it is a violation of everything America
stands for.'" 88
0 1994: "I don't think we should use affirmative action as a wedge issue"-
explaining why it was left out of the Contract with America. 89
0 February 1995: "'It is antithetical to the American dream to measure
people by the genetic pattern of their great-grandmothers."' 90
& August 1995: Republicans should "'spend four times as much effort
83 Mark Hornbeck, Engler Quiet on Racial Quotas: Governor Soft-Pedals Affirmative
Action, Fears It's a No-Win Situation, Etperts Say, DEr. NEws, May 18, 1998, at D1.84 Id.
85 Peter Schmidt, Legislatures Show Little Enthusiasm for Measures to End Racial
Preferences, CHRON. IGmEDUC., Mar. 13, 1998, at A44.
86 David S. Broder & Robert A. Barnes, Few Governors Join Attack on Racial Policies,
WAsH. PosT, Aug. 2, 1995, at Al.
87 Frank Langfitt, GOP Abandons Effort on Minority Set-Asides, BAIT. SUN, May 23,
1995, at lB.
88 Judy Keen & Richard Benedetto, White House Scramble Muddies Bush's Message,
USA TODAY, Nov. 22, 1991, at Al.
89 john Pitney, Why Affirmative Action Is Forgotten Issue, Reuters North American
Wire, May 29, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library.
90 Bob Minzesheimer, Affirmative Action Under Fire, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 1995, at
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reaching out to the black community... as compared to the amount of
effort we've put into saying we're against quotas and set-asides."' 91
* June 1996: It would be a "strategic mistake" for Senator Dole to champion
Proposition 209 during his presidential campaign. 92
* February 1997: "We are going to pursue an all out effort to end affirmative
racism in America. 93
* July 1997: "'We need 80 percent of our effort on proving we have found a
better way to solve the problem and 20 percent of our effort on ending
affirmative action. ''94
* November 1997: Gingrich publicly opposed the appointment of Bill Lann
Lee as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights-"an unusual action for
a House leader who usually does not become involved in Administration
appointments .... 95 Speaker Gingrich opposed Lee's purported effort to
mandate "'racial and gender preferences in the Los Angeles Police
Department"' because it "was an attempt to thwart 'the will of the people
of California .... "96
Representative Gingrich is an unusually colorful speaker-which is why I
have quoted him so extensively rather than, say, Senator Robert Dole, who
shows the same pattern. But his eloquence does not hide his waffling. He is not
inconsistent in his opinion; at least since the late 1980s, he has opposed
affirmative action based on race or gender and supported mild forms of it based
on poverty or cultural deprivation. But he is perennially inconsistent in his
behavior; he sometimes leads the charge against affirmative action, sometimes
seeks to deflect the issue and keep it off the congressional agenda, and
sometimes claims to be leading the charge, but in fact seeks to deflect it. His
Republican critics have taken scathing note of this behavioral inconsistency,97
91 Jennifer Corbett, Gingrich Warns GOP on Effort to End Preferences, L.A. TiMEs,
Aug. 8, 1995, at 1.
92 Ken Chavez, Gingrich to Dole: Back Off CCRI, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 27, 1996, at
Al.
93 Flag-Burning Issue Returns to Congress, CHATrANOOGA FREE PREss, Feb. 13, 1997,
atA4.
94 Christopher Caldwell, The Meritocracy Dodge: Defenders of Affirmative Action Go
on the Attack, WKLY. STANDARD, July 14, 1997, at 23.
95 Steven A. Holmes, Senator Deals Serious Setback to Clinton Choice for Rights Job,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1997, at A16.
9 6 Id.
97 Patrick Buchanan accused people "inside the Republican Party" of "creeping
timidity." This Week with David Brinkley (ABC television broadcast, July 2, 1995).
Representative Canady observed a "big disconnect" between the Speaker's words and actions.
See Michael A. Fletcher, Opponents of Affinnative Action Heartened by Court Decision,
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but it is probably the right political strategy and is probably appreciated by most
of his less vocal Republican colleagues.
Representative Gingrich's and Senator Dole's dilemma, as well as that of
white Democratic politicians, is exacerbated by several demographic and
political dynamics in the African American and Latino communities. On the
one hand, almost three in ten blacks describe themselves as politically
conservative, and an additional third are "moderate." 98 The African American
middle class is growing, if slowly;99 middle-class African Americans remain
more socially and economically liberal than middle-class whites,' 0o but they are
more conservative about taxation, welfare, school vouchers, and the role of the
market than are poorer African Americans,1 01 and more conservative than were
earlier generations of blacks. 102 More African Americans than whites give a
conservative response to survey questions about legalizing marijuana, 103 prayer
WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1997, at A21.
98 See Thinking by Ethnicity, PuB. PERsP., Feb./Mar. 1998, at 55; David A. Bositis,
1997 National Opinion Poll: Politics (The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies,
Washington, D.C. 1997), at 38 fig.2 [hereinafter Bositis, Politics]; David A. Bositis, 1996
National Opinion Poll: Political Attitudes (Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies,
Washington, D.C. 1996), at tbl.3 [hereinafter Bositis, Political Attitudes].
9 9 See JENNIFER HOCHsCHILD, FACING Up TO THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS,
AND THE SOUL OF THE NATION 43-45 (1995).
1OO See 2 THE STATE OF DISUNION: 1996 SuRvEY OF AMEmCAN PoLITcAL CULTURE,
tbls.6A-H, 7, 1OA-S, 11, 42A-H (The Post-Modernity Project, The University of Virginia
ed., 1996) [hereinafter STATE OF DISUNION]; MOLLYANN BRODIE, THE FOUR AMmuCAs:
GoVERNMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY THROUGH THE EYES OF AMERICA'S MuLTI-RAcIAL AND
MuLTI-ErNIc SOCIETY § 2 (1995); Katherine McFate, 1996 National Opinion Poll: Social
Attitudes (Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Washington, D.C. 1996), at
tbls.A7, Bi; Bositis, Politics, supra note 98, at tbhl.6; David A. Bositis, 1997 National
Opinion Poll: Children's Issues (Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies,
Washington, D.C. 1997), at tbl.1; MICHAEL DAwsON, BEHIND THE MULE 181-84 (1994);
Bositis, Political Attitudes, supra note 98, at tbls.2, 3, 7, 8, 11.
10 1 Susan Welch & Michael Combs, Intra-racial Differences in Attitudes of Blacks, 46
PHYLON 91-97 (1985); Wayne Parent & Paul Stekler, The Political Implications of Economic
Stratification in the Black Community, WESTREN POL. Q. 521-37 (1985); Steven Gregory,
The Changing Significance of Race and Class in an African American Community, AM.
ETHNOLOGmT 255-74 (1992); KATHERE TATE, FROM PROTEST TO POLmCS (1993).
10 2 WARREN MILLER & SANTA TRAUGOTr, AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES
DATA SOURCEBOOK, 1952-1986, tbls.3.33, 3.37, 3.41, 3.45, 3.55 (1989).
103 GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL, PUBLIC OPINION 1996, at 48 (1997);
Gallup Poll, Apr. 23-25, 1996, available in Public Opinion Online, accession no. 0258084,
POLL file.
1998] 1023
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
in the public schools, 104 education vouchers, 105 public recognition of
homosexuality, 106 and women's appropriate roles.107 Only 5% of African
Americans identify as Republicans, but 24% call themselves Independents. 10 8
Among black adults aged eighteen to thirty-four, over a third are
Independents. 109 One in seven blacks voted for President Reagan in 1984, and
almost one in five voted for George Bush in 1988.110 In short, there seem to be
good grounds for the often repeated Republican goal of attracting up to a fifth
of the black population, especially those with good jobs and high incomes, into
the GOP.111
There is, however, a rub: middle-class African Americans are more
racially nationalistic than are poor African Americans112 and more concerned
about issues of racial inequality and discrimination. 113 Affirmative action
arguably benefits the African American middle class more than it does the
poor, and therefore, motives of interest reinforce motives of ideology and
disparate perceptions. In short, if the Republican party has any hope of
attracting more than a tiny fraction of black Americans into its ranks, it must
avoid association with those (who are mostly Republicans) seeking to abolish
affirmative action. That is not an easy task.
The Republican party faces a slightly different set of issues when it
considers Latinos. Here too, it seems reasonable for the party to hope to attract
at least a substantial minority of Latino voters. Surveys show the majority to be
104 See Allison Calhoun-Brown, The Politics of Black Evangelicals: What Hinders
Diversity in the Christian Right?, AM. POL. Q., July 1998, at 81, 93; Gallup Poll, Apr. 23-
25, 1996, available in Public Opinion Online, accession no. 0258087, POLL file.
105 See id. at 88; see also Gallup Poll, Apr. 23-25, 1996, available in Public Opinion
Online, accession no. 0258093, POLL file; GALLUP, supra note 103, at 48; Bositis, Politics,
supra note 98, at tbl.7; Bositis, Political Attitudes, supra note 98, at tbl.10; McFate, supra
note 100, at tbl.5.
106 See Calhoun-Brown, supra note 104, at 88; see also GALLUP, supra note 103, at 48.
107 See Calhoun-Brown, supra note 104, at 88.
108 See Thinking by Ethnicity, supra note 98, at 56.
109 See id.; Bositis, Politics, supra note 98, at 37 fig.1.
110 See Thinking by Ethnicity, supra note 98, at 56.
111 Thus, a recent series of headlines: "Democrats Fear Loss of Black Loyalty,"
"Black, yes; Democrats, maybe," "GOP Starts Minority Outreach." Ralph Hallow, GOP
Starts Minority Outreach, WASH. Tfmm, Sept. 17, 1997, at A4; Terry Neal & Thomas
Edsall, Democrats Fear Loss of Black Loyalty, WASH. Posr, Aug. 3, 1998, at Al, A6;
Black, yes; Democrats, maybe, EcoNoMISr, July 18, 1998, at 25-26.
112 See Michael C. Dawson, African American Political Discontent, PoLUN7G REP. (The
Polling Report, Inc., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 18, 1994, at 1, 6-8.
113 See HOCHscHi.D, supra note 99, at 72-82.
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deeply patriotic,'1 4 deeply committed to a traditional work ethic,115 religiously
and culturally conservative," 6 and mistrustful of governmental intervention in
private life.11 7 During the 1990s, just under a third of Americans with Mexican
ancestry described themselves as conservative and just over a third described
themselves as moderates.118 Only twelve percent identify as Republicans, but
four in ten are Independents, and half of those aged eighteen to thirty-four are
Independents.119 Those are fertile grounds for Republican cultivation.
But Latinos on balance support strong programs of affirmative action-less
than African Americans do, but considerably more than whites and Asians
do.' 20 And many are wary of perceived Republican party efforts to curtail
114 See RODOLFO 0. DE LA GARZA Er AL., LATiNo Voicas 79-80, 98, 103, 104 (1992);
STATE OF DmsUNION, supra note 100, at tbls.12A-E, 19, 23G, 44Q, 44AA, 45; Harry Pachon,
U.S. Citizenship and Latino Participation in California Politics, in RACIAL AND ETHNIC
PoLmrs IN CALiFORNmA 71, 71-88 (Byran 0. Jackson & Michael B. Preston eds., 1991).
115 See DE LA GARZA, supra note 114, at 59-61, 84-86; STATE OF DIsuNION, supra note
100, at tbl.4D.
116 See Carole J. Uhlaner, Perceived Discrimination and Prejudice and the Coalition
Prospects of Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans, in RACAL AND ETHNIC PoLrncs IN
CALiFORNIA, supra note 114, at 339, 339-72; Dale Maharidge, The Sleeping Giant Awakes:
The Latino Vote is Coming to an Election Near You--and Neither Major Party is Ready for It,
MoTHm JONEs, Jan./Feb. 1998, at 57, 59; DE LA GARZA, supra note 114, at 37-39, 57-58,
108, 110-11; STATE OF DSNION, supra note 100, at tbls.14E, 15P, 23C, 44D, 44F, 44J,
84, 87.
1 17 See DE LA GARZA, supra note 114, at 81; STATE OF DISUNION, supra note 100, at
tbls.22C, 22E-H, 47B.
118 See Thinking by Ethnicity, supra note 98, at 55-57; see also RODNEY HERO,
LATINoS AND THE U.S. PoLrnCAL SYSTEM 64-66 (1992); DE LA GARZA, supra note 114, at
84.
119 See Thinking by Ethnicity, supra note 98, at 55-57. Almost 40% of Mexican
Americans voted for President Reagan in 1984, and almost a third voted for George Bush in
1988. See id. In 1990, before Proposition 187, 45% of California's Latino voters supported
Governor Wilson. See Maharidge, supra note 116, at 57; see also Roldolfo 0. de la Garza &
Louis DeSipio, Latinos and the 1992 Election: A National Perspective, in ETHNIC IRONIES 1-
4 (Rodolfo 0. de la Garza & Louis DeSipio eds., 1996); DE LA GARZA, supra note 114, at
124-28.
12 0 See Jennifer Hochschild & Reuel Rogers, Race Relations in a Diversifying Nation
14-15 (1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Lawrence Bobo, Race,
Interests, and Beliefs About Affirmative Action, 41 AM. BE-IAv. ScI. 985 (1998); Michael
Hughes & Steven Tuch, Race, Interests and Beliefs About Affirmative Action, in RACIAUmD
PoImcs: VALuES, IDEOLOGY, AND PREJUDICE iN AMERICAN PuBuc OPINION (David Sears
et al. eds., forthcoming); BRODIE, supra note 100, at 47-53; L.A. TNimes POLL, Mar. 1995,
Survey No. 356; David A. Kravitz & Steven L. Klineberg, Reactions to Two Versions of
Affirmative Action Among Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics (1998) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
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immigration and punish immigrants (e.g., through Propositions 187121 and
227122 in California and elimination of food stamps and Medicaid for most
nonnaturalized immigrants in the 1996 national reform of welfare 123). An
unprecedented number of immigrants from Latin America are seeking to
become naturalized U.S. citizens,124 and many of them will register and vote
Democratic, partly in order to punish the Republicans-or at least so GOP
strategists fear. 125
Thus the very states in which increasing proportions of Latino would-be
students and workers are associated with efforts to abolish affirmative action are
the same states in which increasing numbers of new and potential Latino voters
are available to either major political party. Whites are currently a
disproportionate share of registrants, and an even more disproportionate share
of voters 126-but those disproportions are falling. Should Republican politicians
respond to the fears and beliefs of today's majority? If so, they should oppose
121 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West) (to prohibit state services to illegal
immigrants).
122 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 227 (West) (to abolish bilingual education in public
schools).
123 See L.A. Thmes Poll, June 2, 1998, Survey No. 413 (exit poll in the California
primary election).
124 See William Branigin, Nation Receives 18,500 Citizens for Its Birthday, WASH.
POsT, July 5, 1998, at A3.
125 See Harold Brackman & Steven P. Eric, At Rainbow's End: Empowerment
Prospects for Latinos and Asian Pacific Americans in Los Angeles, in 2 RACiAL AND EiNIc
PoLrncs iN CALuFoRIA 73, 85 (Michael B. Preston et al. eds., 1998); Harry P. Pachon,
Latino Politics in the Golden State: Ready for the 21st Century?, in 2 RACIAL AND ETHNIc
PoLmcs iN CALIFORNIA, supra at 411, 415-20; H. Eric Schockman, California's Ethnic
Experiment and the Unsolvable Immigration Issue: Proposition 187 and Beyond, in 2 RAcLAL
AND ETHNIC PoLuIcs iN CALIFORIA, supra at 233, 261-62; A Portrait of the Latino Vote:
Socially Conservative, Young-and Turning out in Greater Numbers, MoTimi. JoNES,
Jan./Feb. 1998, at 58, 59 [hereinafter A Portrait of the Latino Vote]; Louis Aguilar, Capitol
View: Republicans Courting Latino Votes, PourIco: THE FORUM FOR LATINO PoLuTICS,
Mar. 16, 1998, at 1. Five million Latinos voted in the 1996 presidential election, up almost
20% from the previous election. See A Portrait of the Lalino Vote, supra at 58-59. The
number of Latinos voting in the June 1998 election in California was double the number
voting in the 1994 primary. See Amy Pyle et al., Latino Voter Participation Doubled Since
'94 Primary, L.A. TIms, June 4, 1998, at Al.
126 For example, 55% of the residents of California are non-Hispanic whites, but they
represent over 80% of the state's voters. See Carl Lutrin & Allen Settle, California's
Immigration Initiative in the 1994 General Election 4 (Aug. 29-Sept. 2, 1996) (paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) (on file with
author). Put another way, Latinos represented 12% of California's voters in June 1998, but
29% of the state's population. See Pachon, supra note 125, at 415-20; Pyle et al., supra note
125, at Al.
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affirmative action. Or should they gamble that future margins of victory can
come from new, young, potentially conservative Latino voters who are not yet
Republicans and maybe not yet even citizens? If so, they should not oppose
affirmative action. The right answer is not obvious-hence Governor Wilson's
aggressive efforts to abolish affirmative action, Governor Engler's
uncharacteristic silence on the issue, and Representative Gingrich's comical
twisting and turning.
The Democratic story needs fewer details because it is more familiar, but it
is almost as complicated. African Americans are solidly Democratic, and have
provided the margin of victory in several presidential and many congressional
and state-level races. 127 The Democratic party cannot afford to alienate them,
especially the best-off and best-educated, who are the most likely to vote. But
there are too few African Americans for the party to rely exclusively on them,
so it must attract and retain white voters-who are much less sympathetic to
affirmative action. Roughly the same balance of forces obtains in districts
where Latinos are a substantial fraction of voters, except that the proportion of
voters who are Latino will grow-dramatically in some districts and states. On
balance, of course, Democratic politicians and constituencies are more liberal
than their Republican counterparts-so they are more favorably inclined toward
affirmative action, ceteris paribus. Thus, we can predict that most Democratic
politicians will support mild forms of affirmative action strongly, but will avoid
addressing tougher forms at all or approach them with a gingerly "mend it,
don't end it" reform proposal. And that is what most frequently occurs.
In sum, I see no reason to expect a wave of successful efforts to abolish
affirmative action through the electoral system, despite the shared predictions of
the advocates whom I quoted at the beginning of this Article. 128 Even with the
approval of Initiative 200 in the state of Washington, only two states out of fifty
ban the public use of affirmative action. So far, current laws, regulations, and
practices of affirmative action seem reasonably safe elsewhere.
127 See FRANK PARKER, BLACK VoTEs CouNT (1990).
128 See supra Part I. Some projections of uninvolved observers concur. For example, in
May 1998, a proponent of Initiative 200 argued that "'Washington is, I think, the state that
will greatly accelerate the movement toward color-blind civil rights laws.... [Mlf Washington
State votes yes on 200, then a lot of states will feel much more comfortable following suit.'"
Holmes, supra note 49, at Al. The day after Initiative 200 was approved with a 58%
majority, the New York Yimes observed that "the vote in Washington is clearly a boost to
opponents of affirmative action and is likely to spur efforts to get similar measures on the
ballots in other states." Sam Howe Verhovek, From Same-Sex Marriages to Gambling,
Voters Speak, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1998, at Bi, B10.
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I]I. THE JUDICIAL FUTURE OF AFFIRMATiVE ACTION
But the story does not end here. I will compound my reckless
pronouncement of a number and a date at the same time by making another
prediction: strong forms of affirmative action may well be abolished through
the judicial system over the next few years. Efforts to abolish affirmative action
are, in that sense, analogous to efforts to promote school desegregation in the
1950s and 1960s-what cannot be won through the electoral process may be
attainable, at least for a while, through the courts.
The analogy with school desegregation goes beyond the basic strategy of
seeking victory through the courts as well as through elections. The litigators
uncannily resemble the lawyers in the ACLU and NAACP Legal Defense Fund
(LDF) in the 1950s and 1960s. They are a small group of ideologically driven,
energetic young men (mostly) in nonprofit law firms funded by foundations, 129
out to change the United States for the better by requiring its institutions to live
up to the Constitution as they understand it. The two most prominent of the new
public interest law firms are the Center for Individual Rights (CIR) and the
Institute for Justice. 130 The CIR litigated Hopwood v. Texas131 and is currently
involved in two suits against the University of Michigan (one against the liberal
arts college and one against the law school), 132 as well as suits against Texas A
& M University, the National Science Foundation, City University of New
York, the University of Washington Law School, and Alabama State
University. 133 The CIR seeks both to have particular programs of affirmative
action abolished through these suits and to induce the Supreme Court to declare
that "'[Regents of University of California v.] Bakke is not the law of the
129 For example, the Institute for Justice obtains less than one percent of its $2.5 million
budget from corporations (primarily Phillip Morris Co.); the rest comes from individuals and
foundations. See Telephone Interview by Deborah Schildkraut with the Vice President for
Finance (Mar. 17, 1998). Center for Individual Rights lawyers work in private firms and
contribute their work pro bono; most of its $1.2 million budget comes from foundations or
individual donors. See Idris M. Diaz,. Mischief Makers: The Men Behind All Those Anti-
Affirmative Action Lawsuits, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 25, 1997, at 14-21.
130 The American Civil Rights Institute is another key organization although it remains
more in the background. It provides much of the organizational backing and funding for state-
level efforts to abolish affirmative action through the electoral system. Its members work
closely with the law firms, but it does not litigate cases. See David Postman, 1-200 Foes
Leading Battle of the Checkbook, SEArLB Trams, Oct. 14, 1998, at Al; Hines, supra note
64, at A12.
131 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
132 See Center for Individual Rights, Our Mission, (visited Aug. 20, 1998)
<http://www.wdn.com/cir>.
133 See id.
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land.' 134
The second firm, the Institute for Justice, is less involved in ongoing
litigation but provides strong support for the efforts of CIR. Its vice-president,
Clint Bolick (quoted in one of the opening epigrams of this Article) led the
successful effort to prevent the appointments of Lani Guinier and later Bill Lann
Lee to the office of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. The Institute
has been deeply involved in writing and promoting the bills to abolish
affirmative action that have come before Congress several times in the past few
years. One of its missions, like the LDF before it, is to train a cohort of young
and idealistic attorneys to carry its message and tactics across the nation and
into a wide array of issues and venues.
The anti-affirmtive action law firms follow many of the same tactics as the
firms that pursued school desegregation and other traditional civil rights
cases.135 They carefully choose only those cases that they think they have a
reasonable chance of winning, 136 and they concentrate on cases that are most
likely to set new precedents. 137 They work only with plaintiffs who will be
attractive to the public. 138 Like the ACLU, anti-affirmative action law firms
choose some unusual cases or clients so that they can make clear that their
concern is one of deep principle rather than shallow politics. 139 They oversee
strategy and tactics in the national headquarters, but involve local attorneys to
try the cases in court. They seek to bring cases only in the courts of sympathetic
judges, most commonly those appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush.
134 Douglas Lederman, New Lawsuits May Help Determine What's Legal in Affirmative
Action, CHRON. HIGmR EDuC., Mar. 21, 1997 (quoting Michael S. Greve).
135 See David Segal, Putting Affirmative Action on Trial, WASH. PoST, Feb. 20, 1998,
at Al.
136 See id.
137 See id.; Center for Individual Rights, supra note 132.
138 The CIR is extremely sophisticated in its use of the media to build public support for
its suits. Its staff chose the lead University of Michigan plaintiff after reading scores of
resumes and conducting many interviews of would-be plaintiffs; they coached her very
carefully before appearances on national television; they have selectively leaked key
components of their arguments to sympathetic journalists in order "to build momentum for
their case and to put the university on the defensive." See Segal, supra note 135. One of its
twelve employees is a full-time publicist. Similarly, one of the nine members of the
professional staff of the Institute for Justice is a "director of communications."
139 The ACLU supports "extremists" on the right (Ku Klux Klan, Nazi Party) as well as
on the left (Communist Party) in order to show its devotion to the principle of free speech.
CIR supports African Americans seeking to abolish regulations on taxi-driving or licensing of
hair-dressers, as well as opponents of affirmative action, in order to show that it is opposed to
strong governmental regulation rather than anti-black. See, e.g., Black Student Challenges
All-White Scholarship, BLACK Issum N HIGBH EDUc., Sept. 18, 1997, at 6.
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Suits challenging affirmative action are analogous to traditional civil rights
cases not only in their structure and the litigators' personal styles and tactics,
but also in their reliance on many of the same laws. In particular, CIR's suits
against the University of Michigan name the former and current presidents of
the university and the dean and admissions dean of the law school in their
individual capacities as defendants. The basis is Section 1983140 which "permits
individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated to sue those who,
acting under color of state law, violated those rights.' 41 The CIR claims that
the university's administrators "had sufficient information to know that the UM
admissions program clearly violated the Constitution. Hence, we believe they
are not immune from damages in their personal capacities." 142 Section 1983
was passed during the era of Reconstruction in order to permit legal action
against state officials who used their official position to maintain racial
hierarchies. 143 It was revived in the 1960s to be used against Governor George
Wallace, Sheriff Bull Connor, and other upholders of the segregationist laws of
the South.144 Traditional proponents of civil rights laws are deeply distressed at
its use in suits seeking to ban affirmative action. But the law, of course, does
not specify on what side the defendants must be or whether affirmative action
policies violate or sustain an individual's civil rights. A claim against a public
actor in his or her personal capacity is a powerful legal tactic, well suited to
making university or governmental officials think more than twice before
vigorously promoting an affirmative action program in the current legal
climate.
Finally, suits challenging affirmative action are also analogous to traditional
140 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
141 Center for Individual Rights, CIR Begins Second Lawsuit Against University of
Michigan (visited Mar. 24, 1998) <http://www.wdn..com/cir/michprl.htm> (including
Michigan questions and answers, <http://www.wdn.com/cir/michqa.htm>).
142 See id.
143 For a review of the legislative history of § 1983, see, for example, Harry A.
Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain
Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1-20 (1985).
144 See, e.g., id.
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school desegregation cases because they look as though they will win more
often than they will lose. They have already won an impressive string of
victories that have narrowed the scope of affirmative action. The most
emblematic of such victories is not widely known, but it demonstrates the thesis
of this Article as clearly as an author could hope:
Barely one week after Houston voters decided against banning affirmative
action in the city's contracting and hiring [through Proposition A in November
1997], a Federal judge today threw out a similar program for the county transit
authority, accompanying his ruling with a blistering criticism of affirmative
action that seems likely to fuel the nation's unresolved legal and political debate
over the issue.145
At about the same time, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals eliminated
affirmative action in university admissions in Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana
through Hopwood;146 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found Proposition
209147 to be constitutional; 148 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated
race-based scholarships at public universities in five states; 149 and the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia eliminated a federal requirement that radio
and television stations seek out minority job applicants. 150
At present, most of the judicial action remains at the district and appeals
court levels. The Supreme Court declined to rule on the Hopwood'5' or
Proposition 209 cases152 because, as Justice Ginsberg wrote for the Court, "We
must await a final judgment on a program genuinely in controversy before
addressing the important question raised in this petition."' 153 In other words, the
145 Sam Howe Verhovek, Judge Kills Texas Affirmative Action Plan, N.Y. Tams, Nov.
14, 1997, at A33 (reporting on the ruling in Houston Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan
Transit Auth., 984 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D. Tex. 1997)); see also Ron Nissimov et al., Judge
Rejects Last Fall's Vote, Hous. CHRON., June 27, 1998, at Al.
146 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
147 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 209 (West) (enacted as CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 in
1996, prohibiting discrimination by public entities).
148 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
149 See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 147 (4thCir. 1994), aff'g 956 F.2d 52 (4th
Cir. 1992).
150 See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
151 See 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (denying certiorari).
152 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 118 S. Ct. 17 (1997) (mem. denying
certiorari).
153 Henry J. Reske, Law School Lessons: The Supreme Court Lets Stand a Ruling
Barring Race-based Admissions, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 29 (quoting Texas v. Hopwood,
518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.) (denying certiorari)). During 1998, the Supreme Court
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Court wants to allow the political process to play out a bit further before it rules
again on affirmative action. 154
But the Court's present restraint gives little comfort to proponents of
affirmative action. After all, restraint follows a series of decisions suggesting
hostility to, or at least suspicion of, policies that differentiate by race (e.g.
Miller v. Johnson;155 Missouri v. Jenkins'56). Furthermore, a series of
decisions by the Supreme Court on affirmative action over the past two decades
has narrowed its scope and increased the stringency of the requirements that an
actor needs to meet in order to impose an affirmative action plan on its
employees or contractors.
The crucial starting point for affirmative action jurisprudence, of course,
was Regents of University of Califomia v. Bakke. 157 Just what the Bakke ruling
held remains controversial, but most actors interpreted it to mean that
universities could take race into account along with other factors in admissions
decisions. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,158 narrowed the scope of
affirmative action slightly by rejecting the role-model justification for retaining
minority rather than nonminority teachers in decisions about layoffs. 159 The
Court did not, however, challenge affirmative action in general or the "goal of
promoting racial diversity among the faculty" in particular. 160 Three years
later, Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.161 further narrowed the scope of
affirmative action, albeit along a different dimension. It held that city and state
set-aside provisions must satisfy the high standard of strict scrutiny, rather than
the lower standard of intermediate scrutiny. 162 The next case, Metro
Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC163 reinforced the standard of intermediate scrutiny
for federal set-asides, 164 thereby showing that the Court was not of one mind
also declined to take affirmative action cases in Nevada and Florida. See Affirmative Action
Plan Dead in Miami; Court Refuses to Hear Case, FLA. TWES UNION, Mar. 10, 1998, at A-
1.
15 4 That resembles the initial restraint of the Warren Court, which issued very few broad
rulings on school desegregation until more than a decade after Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 686 (1954).
155 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
156 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
157 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
158 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
159 See id. at 274-76.
160 Id. at 288 n.*.
161 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
162 See id. at 495.
163 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
164 See id. at 566-68.
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about either the overall trajectory or the fine details of affirmative action. But
the fine distinctions were swept aside in Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,1 65
which held that racial classifications at any level of government must be strictly
scrutinized in order to see if they are "narrowly tailored" to achieve a
"compelling governmental interest." 166
To some interpreters, that decision "reveals that at least two and perhaps
four justices are willing to ban racial preferences in all circumstances" 167
Others seek to demonstrate that contracting is judicially distinct from admissions
decisions in higher education, and that the increasingly restrictive line of
reasoning from Croson to Adarand need not-and in the eyes of the Court,
does not-extend to schools. 168 A different dimension of interpretation also
reveals contradictory inferences from Adarand: one interpreter sees the crucial
change to be the Court's new willingness to restrict the power of Congress, 169
while another applauds the Court's "meandering course .... [and] refusal to
issue rules" because it leaves the democratic process of decisionmaking as open
and unconstrained as possible. 170
The Editor of the American Bar Association's Preview of United States
Supreme Court Cases-as neutral an authority as exists in this vexed arena-
writes that it is "not exactly" the case that "all of this sound[s] the death knell
for affirmative action.' 171 In her view, affirmative action "undertaken to cure
165 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (overruling Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC).
166 Id. at 235-36.
167 Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, NEW REPUBuc, July 31, 1995, at 19-25.
That is why civil rights groups provided most of the funds for an out of court settlement of an
affirmative action case in Tarman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (1996).
It is rare for any case to be settled once the Supreme Court has agreed to hear the
dispute, and virtually unheard-of for third parties to direct the settlement. But the civil
rights groups believed that the stakes were so high in this case that it was better to
intervene than risk an adverse high-court ruling.
Joan Biskupic, Rights Groups Pay to Settle Bias Case, WAsH. PosT, Nov. 22, 1997, at Al.
168 See, e.g., Akil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA. L.
REV. 1745, 1746 (1996).
169 See Paul J. Mishkin, Forward: The Making of a Turning Point-Metro and
Adarand, 84 CAL. L. REv. 875, 876 (1996).
170 Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court,
84 CAL. L. REv. 1179, 1179 (1996).
171 L. Anita Richardson, What Is the Constitutional Status of Affirmative Action?
Reading Tea Leaves, Focus ON LAW STUDms, Spring 1998, at 19.
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established past or present discrimination is permissible," although affirmative
action programs "established solely to promote racial diversity" are dead.172
The Supreme Court might not abolish affirmative action grounded in
clearly proven past discrimination-hence my caution about never giving a
number and a date at the same time. But the CIR and its allies have chosen their
cases very shrewdly; if they can get several appeals courts to declare Bakke to
be no longer the law of the land in their circuit, as the Hopwood appeals court
did, then the Supreme Court will most likely feel compelled to intervene to
reconcile the disparities among the circuits. At that point, a Supreme Court
comprised of its current members may set the bar against affirmative action so
high that virtually no firm, university, or contract-letting agency can surmount
it. After all, many members of the current Court (and, plausibly, new members
over the next decade) are characterologically, if not ideologically, conservative.
Affirmative action is, in the eyes of almost all who think hard about it, an
anomaly, sitting uncomfortably between the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which
ostensibly barred its use, and Americans' desire for real, not merely nominal,
racial equality. Even proponents agree that it is a stop-gap, temporary
measure-although essential, in their eyes. It is not difficult to envision a
cautious, centrist Court deciding that enough is enough, except in rare
circumstances.
IV. MAINTAINING MORAL CONSISTENCY ON SLIPPERY TERRAIN
The comparison I am drawing between the era of school desegregation and
the era of attacks on affirmative action has not escaped the attention of the chief
participants. The Financial Profile of the Institute for Justice begins:
People once turned to groups like the ACLU when government violated their
rights. But as these groups fought in recent years to create a "right" to welfare,
to preserve racial preferences, and to block school choice, people increasingly
sought a principled alternative that would protect individual rights rather than
expand government.
The Institute for Justice opened its doors in 1991 to be that alternative.173
Michael Greve, Executive Director of the CIR, justifies an argument about the
appropriate "legal baseline" for civil rights laws with the observation, "[t]he
172 Id.
173 Institute for Justice, Investigating in the Institute for Justice: Capitalizing the Fight
for Liberty, (visited Aug. 20, 1998) <http://www.institutefoijustice.org/ProfleFolder/prof
financial, htnl>.
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NAACP learned that in the sixties, and we'll learn that now." 174
Does this imply that those who celebrated the federal courts' supercession
of popular preferences with regard to school desegregation must now do the
same with regard to affirmative action if they wish to be morally consistent? To
put the same question another way, must those who decried judicial activism
and antidemocratic elitism in the former case do the same in the latter? If so,
liberals and conservatives should be equally discomfited by the strange career
of affirmative action.
If one interprets democratic values in procedural terms, the answer to both
questions is "yes." That is, if one sees democratic legitimacy primarily as a
matter of popular control over difficult and important policy issues, so long as
that control is channeled through neutral electoral institutions and all citizens
have an equal chance to express their opinions and cast a vote, then one must
accept the continuance of affirmative action with good grace. That will be
difficult for ideological conservatives, just as acceding to popular resistance to
mandatory school desegregation was difficult for ideological liberals. 175
Alternatively, if one includes defensible decisions by legally chosen judges in
fairly conducted trials as part of the legitimate democratic process, then one
must accept the possible abolition of affirmative action with good grace. That
will be difficult for ideological liberals, just as accepting judicial intervention in
school systems was difficult for ideological conservatives. Viewed as an issue
of procedural democracy, the strange career of affirmative action seems to
exemplify the old saying, "what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander."
But if one interprets democratic values in substantive rather than procedural
terms-or rather, if one focuses on the fact that the United States is a liberal
democracy rather than a democracy-the normative implications of the strange
career of affirmative action are somewhat different. In this framing, the tension
lies between different definitions of liberalism rather than between different
ways of putting the concept of democracy into practice.
If one uses the original understanding of liberalism-with its focus on
174 Diaz, supra note 129, at 15.
175 After reading an earlier draft, David Orentlicher queries, "why wasn't popular
resistance to mandatory school desegregation a situation in which the political process wasn't
working properly because of the invidious bias against blacks [in the electoral arena].... In
contrast, the political process is working properly with respect to affirmative action, and
therefore judicial intervention is not justified." He cites JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
D sRusr (1980), in support of his point. The point is a good one. During the period of
greatest intervention in school desegregation issues, however (1965-1975, roughly) African
Americans could vote and hold office. So the issue becomes a subtle judgment about timing,
electoral trajectory, and historical counterfactual. It is also worth noting that the ability of a
minority (such as African Americans and their allies) to promulgate a complicated and
contentious policy like school desegregation would be close to nonexistent even today.
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individual autonomy, rights conceived primarily as defenses against others'
encroachment, mistrust of governmental power, greater trust of market forces-
then one can consistently decry the school desegregation judges and celebrate
the anti-affirmative action judges. Such a person is likely to insist, as Ward
Connerly and his supporters do over and over, that "'[e]very poll that I have
seen which takes a look at the American people's attitudes on preferences will
support my position that the majority are opposed to preferences." 1 76 One can
also assert, as does the Institute for Justice, that its activities against affirmative
action "offer ... legal and constitutional protection of the American
Dream .... "177 In this view, using the courts to abolish affirmative action-
because, as Regent Connerly puts it, "'I can't find a legislative body that has
the guts, the stomach to do what they should do"' 178-is both liberal and
democratic. It is liberal because it enhances individual freedom and rights. It is
democratic because it produces the policy result that-according to opponents-
the majority of the public wants. Because mandatory school desegregation in
this view was neither liberal nor democratic, moral consistency lies in
supporting judge-made law now after having opposed it then.
However, if one uses the post-New Deal understanding of liberalism-with
its focus on respect for group-based diversity as a component of public
engagement, rights conceived as the public provision of structures that make it
possible for all to attain success, greater trust in governmental than in market
forces in some circumstances-then one is in the symmetrically opposite
position of consistently celebrating the school desegregation judges and
decrying the anti-affirmative action judges. This view is bolstered by the claim
that, as Mayor Lanier put it when lauding the defeat of Proposition A in
Houston, "This is a very decent city, and while there were... those who felt
we had reached a level playing field with women and minorities, others knew
that is just not the world we live in.,, 179 It is also bolstered by the belief that
strong programs of affirmative action foster rather than inhibit freedom and
rights for all Americans, as in the first two epigrams with which this Article
began. Thus, in this view, using the courts to abolish affirmative action is
neither liberal nor democratic. It is illiberal because it denies rights and freedom
to those whose rights have been denied and whose opportunities are illusory. It
176 Holmes, supra note 49, at Al. That, of course, one of the lessons of the regression
analysis described earlier; politicins in states with direct initiatives think that they have a
good chance of winning their point, or at least maing political gains, if they take the issue of
abolishing affirmative action directly to the voters.
177 Institute for Justice, supra note 174.
178 Holmes, supra note 49, at Al.
179 Julie Mason, Voters Keep Affirmative Action Program Alive, Hous. CHRoN, Nov. 5,
1997, at Al.
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is undemocratic because-according to proponents-most Americans really do
not endorse such a denial. Mandatory school desegregation, in contrast, did
support deep understandings of liberalism and democracy; 180 therefore moral
consistency lies in decrying judge-made law now after having endorsed it then.
We are back where we started-with two sets of views that start from
shared deep procedural and substantive values, but that interpret those values in
ways that are made to be incommensurate. Neither extreme is the only possible
way to interpret those values, and probably most Americans do not so interpret
them. After all, surveys in both California' 8 ' and Houston182 showed that" '[i]f
you give people a middle position, they'll take it'. . "183 But the electoral
system is better at muddling toward a "middle position" than is the legal
system, which is why advocates on both sides have generally relied more on
judges than on voters to attain their ends.
I predict that opponents of affirmative action will come closer to prevailing
over the next decade or so than will proponents because they have learned an
effective legal strategy from their old adversaries and can use it in the courts of
a new generation of judges. Whether abolition of affirmative action will prevail
in the long run, as mandatory school desegregation mostly did not, is a question
on which I will not venture a prediction. Whether one can be pleased with the
abolition of affirmative action through judicial decisions in a morally consistent
manner is not a matter for prediction, and here, too, I will refrain from further
comment.
180 See JENNnFER Hoc cILD, THE NEw A mUCAN DrrnMA: LI.ERAL DEMOCRACY
AND SCHOOL DESEGREGAnON (1984).
181 See Lempinen, supra note 16, at Bl.
182 See Sam Howe Verhovek, Houston to Vote on Repeal of Affirmative Action, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at A28.
183Id. (quoting Bob Stein, Dean of the School of Social Sciences at Rice University).
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